E ach seated at a computer, two boys, Jeffrey and John, are asked to read a passage, read a question about the passage, and then choose the best answer from three possible choices. First, we see Jeffrey move his eyes while looking at the passage; then, we see him move his eyes in a way that directs his gaze toward the question. He moves the mouse connected to the computer and we see the on-screen cursor move to the question, then down to each possible answer, moving slowly from one to another. We see the cursor move to the passage, move back and forth in one particular spot in the passage, and then move back to the possible answers. The cursor hovers over one of the possible answers, and we see the mouse button pressed. A mark on the display screen appears. We see a confirmation that the answer is correct.
THE RELATION OF THE WRITER TO THE READER
To the extent that the printed text overlaps with the verbal repertoire of the reader, one can be guided by the same (or similar) stimulus-control relations that guide the writer. Such guidance (after Donahoe & Palmer, 2004 ) is provided not so much by the dimensional control presented by the text-that is, the printed words-but by the instructional control those words exert over the reader's behavior-that is, the reader's history of responding to those words. Such instructional control serves to restrict reader response alternatives to match those of the writer more closely. The distinction between instructional and dimensional control (see Goldiamond, 1966) or guidance is important for understanding how we may think about text. Goldiamond (1966 Goldiamond ( , 1967 Goldiamond ( /2004 described two types of guidance that make up any stimulus-control topography (see Ray, 1969; Ray & Sidman, 1970) . These include both to "what" one responds and "how" one responds i,a should not be understood solely as guidance by instructions leaning against the tree, " he too sees a sparkling bicycle, not an old, dirty one, and he sees it on an angle against a tree, not held up by a kickstand. And Jeffrey, too, may feel some of Sam's excitement.
DIMENSIONAL AND INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDANCE OF BEHAVIOR
Next, Jeffrey reads the question, "How did Sam feel when he saw his new bicycle?" Again, he hears the words as he reads. He then reads, "sad, happy, funny. " But Jeffrey hears himself say, "It wants me to find how Sam feels. I'll look back in the passage to see if I can find 'sad, ' 'happy, ' or 'funny. ' No… no… I can't find any of those words in the passage. I'll have to look for clue words that will help me think about how Sam was feeling. Here it says, 'When Sam saw his new bike, he grinned. ' Hmmm, 'grinned. ' That makes me think Sam was feeling happy, and 'happy' is one of the possible answers. I'll put a mark next to 'happy. '" It appears that what determined where each boy put their mark was their thinking. One boy more or less guessed, while the other systematically thought about what needed to be done and did it. But was their thinking responsible? The boys may experience precisely what was described, but does that account for the difference in their answers? Why did each think something different, and what determines that? And if we want to improve learner performance, what needs to be done?
What we just examined is an instance of what may be called reading comprehension. In fact, it is an example of what has come to be called inferential comprehension-that is, the answer to the question was not specifically found in the passage. Our learners had to figure it out.
But we are getting a little ahead of ourselves. First, a primary question needs to be asked: "What does it mean to comprehend text?" Goldiamond and Dyrud (1966) attacked this problem with the following illustration. They suggested that if one, in front of a room full of people, writes on a blackboard, "look at the ceiling, " some may verbalize "look at the ceiling, " while others may tilt their heads and look up. The ones looking up demonstrate comprehension. That is, we observe a contingency-specific (evaluated) change in a referent behavior as a function of seeing the text. For those who simply spoke the words in order, we cannot draw the same conclusion. They may simply be able to see and say each word. This is a distinction reading teachers make between comprehension and decoding, and it's why oral reading is not taken as the only indicator that a learner can read. All reading comprehension tests assess this difference.
Changes in referent behaviors as a function of textual stimuli fall into many different categories. These changes begin at the level of the word. For example, each word read is made up of phonetic elements that together provide an occasion for behavior that differs depending on their sequence ("dog" versus "god, " for example). Further, sequences of letters and of words have effects that vary with differences in their sequence ("bike saw new Sam his" versus "Sam saw his new bike"), as well as other autoclitic effects (see Skinner, 1957) . Accordingly, we evaluate whether or not something is understood by testing for specified changes in referent behaviors as a function of changes in the text. If a learner sees the letters c-a-t and then says "cat, " we have textual responding, or decoding. If the learner points to a picture of a cat, we have a different change in referent behavior that can also be evaluated, a tact (after Skinner, 1957) .
We can go further. We can assess a range of relations potenti- We may see the individual grasp an invisible steering wheel, adjust their feet, and extend their arms, though no steering wheel is present. We might also observe subtle movements of the hands as if one is adjusting the car's direction while driving. If we shout, "There's a cat in the road!" we may see a sudden movement as to indicate a rapid turning of the wheel. We may even notice an "emotional" response indicated by raised eyebrows or rules, but includes those relations (see Figure 1) . By treating dimensional and instructional guidance separately, one can set up and more precisely test for the maintenance and transfer of many different aspects of stimulus control. These variations include:
1 i guidance: Saying "ball" in the presence of a ball, saying "used to play a game" in the presence of a ball, and then saying "used to play a game" in the presence of a hockey puck. This formulation may not be familiar to some readers and, unfortunately, the treatment here is necessarily brief. However, an extended discussion of these relations and their programing can be found in Goldiamond (1966) and Thompson (1967/2004) .
Here is a procedural example:
The procedure is actually quite simple. D i may also arise through having a common response to a set of stimuli or occur through a history of pairing stimuli. It can be established through stimulus variation (abstractional-only responses to red are reinforced) and other procedures, or previously established instructional guidance may be transferred through instruction, as in the request to "respond to the color of a stimulus" (rather than its weight, etc.).
B
count may be simply to assume the words on the page provide S D i guidance over yet another class of behavior, hearing words in this case.
3 Accordingly, there may be no subvocal speech, as is often conceptualized. 4 This raises a question: how is complex textual guidance established and how can it be taught? Two separate repertoires appear to be required. The first consideration is that a reader verbal repertoire exists that overlaps with what is written. The second consideration is that an investigatory repertoire exists that can increase the likelihood of a verbal repertoire reorganization needed to meet contingency requirements (cf Markle, 1981) .
THE VERBAL REPERTOIRE OF THE READER AND READING COMPREHENSION
It is essential that the verbal repertoire of the reader overlap with what the writer has written. One problem confronted by those interested in teaching reading comprehension is ensuring that the necessary verbal repertoire is indeed in place. Part of the answer lies in work on establishing functional and equivalence classes (e.g., Wirth & Chase, 2002) . This work is most useful in understanding how metonymical extension may occur. That is, how can stimuli that share no defining features (as opposed to generically extended tacts) be brought under the same S D i guidance? This is an important question: the printed text "stoplight" shares no properties with an actual stoplight. Such guidance needs to be directly taught. Further, we can teach stopping, saying "stop, " and writing "stop" when the stoplight is seen. In this case, procedures derived from the equivalence literature can be quite helpful (e.g., Sidman, 1994) .
We can further extend the S D i guidance by making our stopping responses to a range of stimuli that occasion stopping, a "disjunctive concept" (after Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956) . A policeman with a raised hand, a stopped school bus, flashing lights at a railroad crossing, etc., are all stimuli that occasion stopping. None of these share stimulus features, yet they do share common response features: stated differently, they have become functionally equivalent (from Goldiamond, 1966;  see Figure 2 ). In discussing such stimulus classes, Goldiamond (1962) observed that "once a class is established, contingencies applied to one member of a class tend to affect other members of the class" (p. 303).
We may, however, be able to group these stimuli in the class of "dangerous" driving situations or in terms of the situations for which drivers may incur a penalty if they do not stop. Here we 3 This account shares some similarities with Saussure's ([1916] 1983) relational conception of meaning and his analysis of the role of the signifier (the form the stimulus takes) and the signified (the concept it represents) as features of textual understanding. And further, the approach suggested here may perhaps provide a useful unifying framework for those who debate the material versus purely psychological existence of the signifier. It is both and it is neither: that is, the relation resides in the consequential contingencies of which it is a part. Thanks to Zachary Layng for bringing this to our attention. (Skinner, 1966) . This is an important distinction. Behavior under S A demonstration we have used in the classroom can illustrate this difference. We write the word "STRENGTH" on a blackboard. After looking at the word for a couple of minutes, we ask that half the class close their eyes and visualize the word: that is, see it privately. We ask those with their eyes closed who can readily see it to raise their hands. Next we pick one or more people from the audience, confirm that they can clearly see the word, and ask them to start with the last letter and say each letter in the word: H T G N E R T S. Unless one has had special training, this is quite difficult to do. Now, we ask audience members with their eyes wide open and looking at the word to do the same. We observe quite a different outcome. We maintain that there is no word being privately looked at. What we have is the behavior of seeing under S D i guidance. This is not an altogether new interpretation. As Skinner (1963) , in perhaps his most complete treatment of private events, Behaviorism at Fifty, observes, "It took man a long time to understand that when he dreamed of a wolf, no wolf was actually there. It has taken him much longer to understand that not even a representation of a wolf is there" (p. Since there is no private stimulus, what we often observe is the recurrence of a spelling repertoire in order to meet the request to read the word last letter to the first. People will often spell the word aloud, and after getting to the letter prior to H, say "T" and repeat the process until all the letters are said. This is never observed for those whose eyes are open.
The private seeing of the word "strength" is part of the behavior of seeing; it does not require something seen (Skinner, 1963) , thus, perhaps, accounting for the ephemeral nature of private events. The episodes of "fleeting" thoughts, images, sounds, etc., may simply be reflections of behavior under fleeting S D i guidance in the absence of an S D d. What is "heard, " "thought, " or even "seen" while reading may be the changes in response probabilities occasioned by changes in instructional guidance over the reader's behavior that have been established by a past contingent history. Importantly, this may include hearing words read. That is, there is no need to assume that the words privately "heard" while reading are first privately "said. " Just as there is no private image of a word required for a word to be seen, no word needs to be privately spoken for a word to be privately heard. A more parsimonious ac-only sequences containing multiple exemplars, but sequences containing multiple juxtaposed non-exemplars (Markle, 1978; Markle & Tiemann, 1969 , 1974 Tiemann & Markle, 1990 ; also see Englemann & Carnine, 1991) in very carefully programed sequences (Markle, 1991) . From the perspective of those interested in teaching children to comprehend text, the formulation presented here has led to exciting teaching possibilities and the development of new approaches to teaching "vocabulary" (see Sota et al., 2011 and Leon et al., 2011) .
Sequences of words also have autoclitic effects that must be considered (cf. Ferster & Perrott, 1968) . Some of these relational autoclitic functions depend on abstract tact guidance and the range of what might be "thought about" on generic extension to exemplars. For example, in the sentence, "The dog believes that he will be fed when the refrigerator door is open, " we see a range of abstract tacts: dog, believe, fed, refrigerator, door, and open. In that sentence, "believes" provides the minimal tact (after Skinner, 1957, p. 333) that sets up the autoclitic frame "X change the S D d to include the contingency into which these stimuli may enter. That is, the entire flashing road sign-stop-avoid a crash relation is tacted. Dangerous situations may describe an abstract tact: that is, it may have a set of common features (likely involving harmful outcomes)-S D i-that may occasion its use. Further, the abstract tact can extend guidance along a vast range of varying features of changing S D ds, thus creating the "concept" (see Figures 3 & 4) of "dangerous. " Accordingly, we may find instances where metonymical tacts can either intertwine with or be superseded by abstract tact guidance by first changing S D d guidance to include an observed outcome and then changing S D i from "respond to stimuli where a common response is required" to "respond to stimuli when driving where there may be a potential harmful outcome. " 5 Interestingly, Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) noted in their classic book A Study of Thinking that their subjects tended to abhor disjunctive concepts and would gravitate to conjunctive classification whenever possible. This is important because while the topography of a response may be similar, the response effort to learn disjunctive relations may be much greater than for conjunctive. It may even suggest that little human categorical responding involves "pure" disjunctive equivalence relations. Accordingly, we may observe individuals giving stimuli common names or responding to a common consequence. Further, procedures that are good for establishing (disjunctive) metonymical relations, as found in the stimulus equivalence and related areas (see Figure 5 ), may not be as effective at establishing (conjunctive) abstract relations as are other procedures. For example, guidance by "larger than" may perhaps be established through a stimulus-equivalence or RFT procedure or taught as a "concept" based on a sequence featuring a carefully analyzed rational set of juxtaposed examples and non-examples.
What is required to establish conjunctive relations is not 5 We can go even further and program feature and S D i inheritance hierarchies (Layng, 2005; Markle & Tiemann, 1980) 
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Lacks derived-word-meaning comprehension. Each form of comprehending may require a separate investigative repertoire. Since these are described in detail by Sota et al. (2011) , a more general overview is presented here. Changes in an evaluated referent behavior are used to determine if a given written passage is understood. Accordingly, these evaluation criteria (see Sota et al., 2011) require that a reader do more than say the words in the passage or even paraphrase the text. In many cases, learners are asked a series of questions they must answer or, even more likely when it comes to more standardized evaluation, they must choose from among an array of possible answers. They may also have to follow a procedure or demonstrate how the text has changed their repertoire such that they can now perform a task or solve a problem they could not prior to reading the text. Whatever the requirement, they may need to be able to generate supplementary verbal stimulation (Palmer, 1991; Robbins, 2004 Robbins, , 2011 Skinner, 1957 Skinner, , pp. 253 -292, 1966 ) that quickly and effectively aligns the S D i guidance required to meet the contingency requirement to the S D i actually guiding their behavior. This process involves providing a verbal repertoire whose sequence is conditional on key abstract tacts concerning comprehension type and requirements. We saw an example of one investigative repertoire in our example of Jeffrey's "private activity" at the outset of this article. Jeffrey reads the question, "How did Sam feel when he saw his new bicycle?" He hears the words as he reads. Next, he reads, "sad, happy, funny. " But Jeffrey hears the words, "It wants me to find how Sam feels. I'll look back in the passage to see if I can find 'sad, ' 'happy, ' or 'funny' . No… no… I can't find any of those words in the passage. I'll have to look for clue words that will help me think about how Sam was feeling. Here it says, 'When Sam saw his new bike, he grinned. ' Hmmm, 'grinned. ' That makes me think Sam was feeling happy, and 'happy' is one of the possible answers. I'll put a mark next to 'happy. '" One could infer that Jeffrey's thinking led him to the correct answer and, therefore, that his thinking guided his behavior. But why did he think as he did? He read the question and the possible answers. At that point, certain public and private patterns were made more likely than others (e.g., John's patterns). Somebelieves that Y. " Once the abstract tact "believe" is established, many other textual stimuli can be substituted in this frame. "Believe" has two critical features that define the S D i guidance: first, the absence of an event, and second, action taken to affirm existence of the event. To teach a young learner the concept of believing would require a minimal teaching set of six examples and two non-examples (see Figures 6 & 7) . The six exemplars are determined by an analysis of the range of varying features found in statements of belief. The two non-examples are determined by the number of critical features such that when one is removed, "believe" is no longer defined (see Sota et al., 2011 and Markle, 1990 , for further discussion). By ensuring the greatest range of generic extension for "believe, " we ensure the greatest range of autoclitic frame guidance. All of this is part of building a verbal repertoire that is necessary to comprehend text. A range of procedures can expand and extend verbal repertoires where required (see Leon et al. 2011; Sota et al., 2011 ; for an elaboration, see also Alesi, 1998 and Shahan & .
THE INVESTIGATIVE REPERTOIRE OF THE READER AND READING COMPREHENSION
Whereas learners from rich verbal backgrounds may need very little direct intervention in terms of the breadth of their verbal repertoire, they may still need to acquire the investigative repertoire that makes verbal repertoire reorganization and extension more likely. Robbins (2004 Robbins ( , 2011 has described in some detail a general procedure for establishing such a repertoire. In the case of comprehending text, several distinct repertoires may be required depending on the type of comprehension one is looking to establish. These include literal, inferential, main-idea, and distant private events. That is, we should be able to teach thinking and how to comprehend text.
Establishing a text comprehension repertoire is complicated by the fact that separate repertoires may be required for each comprehension type and that they must be built into a more general repertoire which allows for the determination of the precise patterns required. Further, the investigative repertoire rests upon an overlap between the writer's and reader's verbal repertoires. All conditions need to be in place.
Over the past five years, a concerted effort has been made to apply this analysis to the research and development of a program to teach typical school-age children how to comprehend written text. That effort resulted in a fifty-lesson online program, Headsprout® Reading Comprehension. Such an effort took years of analysis, design, testing, redesign, and retesting until the program produced the patterns required for comprehension and the associated private activities. For descriptions of the research and development process, see Layng, Stikeleather, & Twyman (2006) and Twyman et al. (2004) . The research and development effort required a thorough analysis of the comprehension types to be taught, including the instructional/abstractional guidance required, along with the entire range of generic extension needed (see Sota et al., 2011) . Determining the stimulus-control topographies required was a critical first step in program design, without which no program could be designed. Once the relations that needed to be established were identified, repertoire overlap considerations needed to be addressed. This included specifying entry decoding levels, the progression of text complexity, the teaching of critical abstract tacts, justin-time vocabulary support, textually provided repertoire reorganization that made application of investigatory repertoires more successful, the precise investigatory repertoires required, and finally the procedures required for establishing four different comprehension repertoires (see Leon et al., 2011; Sota et al., 2011 ).
Children's thinking about text was the target of this effort and has been observed, through talk-aloud protocols used in our laboratory, to change as a function of the program. Over 150 children participated in our single-subject control-analysis R&D effort (after Goldiamond & Thompson, 1967 /2004 . Design protocols required that learners meet a range of pre-established criteria. If learners were not meeting criteria, the program was changed until the criteria were met. Over the course of development, the children's ability to answer complex questions about text greatly improved. An elaboration on this process may be found in Leon et al. (2011) .
As of this writing, over 50,000 children are using the product and producing data which will ultimately determine its largescale effectiveness as measured by standardized reading comprehension assessments. Since learner performance is gathered online for each comprehension type, we are continually analyzing the data and making adjustments in the program. We are greatly encouraged by the data we are seeing. For example, early data from a Chicago elementary school are encouraging. At this school, where student performance has historically been quite low on city-wide assessments, children who completed at least 20 lessons of the reading comprehension program scored over 60% correct on state-wide reading assessments in comparison thing occurred while the boys were interacting with the text that provided different S D i guidance over Jeffrey and John's private "hearing, " "seeing, " etc. Such S D i guidance is what may account for both the hearing and the subsequent observed patterns, rather than the private events guiding the observed pattern.
DESIGNING AND BUILDING A PROGRAM TO TEACH LEARNERS HOW
TO COMPREHEND TEXT If this is the case, to understand such guidance, we must investigate the program that established the pattern (Goldiamond, 1974; Goldiamond & Thompson, 1967 /2004 Layng, 1995; Layng, Stikeleather, & Twyman, 2006; Layng, Twyman, & Stikeleather, 2004a , 2004b Moore & Goldiamond, 1964; Twyman, Layng, Stikeleather, & Hobbins, 2004) . A program can be defined as a sequence of contingencies with changing criteria that establishes a replicable behavioral outcome. If different programs result in different outcomes, the "cause" of the observed outcome and the associated thinking (and other putative private events) may then reside not in the activities, but in the program. This suggests the study of thinking and other private activity may best be considered the study of programs. Further, if the account presented here has merit, it should be possible to provide programs that result in predictable outcomes and predictable egory of "Best Online Instructional Solution. " A more detailed analysis of the program and its development is provided by Leon et al. (2011) and Sota et al. (2011) .
CONCLUSION
The interpretation and analysis framework presented here has been used to effectively design and produce a program that changes how children think about text. We do not consider private events to be separate stimuli or behaviors that occur inside the skin and to which a person responds. Instead, we argue that hearing, seeing, smelling, touching, and tasting can be brought under S D i guidance alone, as well as joint S D d/S D i guidance. By recognizing the two forms of guidance, we may be able to provide an interpretation that accounts for private experience without the necessity of postulating a private stimulus to which a person privately responds. By focusing on programs as independent variables, rather than on private events, we have not only been able to produce the changes in learner comprehending we sought, but we may also be helping to provide a comprehensive yet parsimonious approach to the problem of investigating the complex human behavior suggested by "thinking. "
to the city average of 53%. The previous year those same learners scored far below the city average, with about 37% correct. Further, much to the joy of their teachers, the seven learners who finished all 50 lessons achieved a perfect score on year-end classroom assessments. We are also seeing learners in eleven Tennessee schools making substantial gains on state reading comprehension tests, turning around years of disappointing standardized test score results.
In a major recognition of the efficacy of applying behavioral contingency analysis to solving complex cognitive problems, Headsprout Reading Comprehension was selected from a group of over 300 products to receive the Software Industry and Information Association's coveted 2010 CODiE Award in the cat-MINIMUM EXAMPLE SET 1. They see no one trapped inside a burning building, but everyone is not accounted for; they look inside (believe someone is trapped inside). [1; 2; 3b; 4b; 5b; 6b; 7b] 2. I pray to God for good health (believe in God). [1; 2; 3b; 4c; 5a; 6a; 7c] 3. The car has been sitting for a month, and I get my key to start it (believe the car will start). [1; 2; 3a; 4a; 5a; 6b; 7a] 4. The dog runs back and forth between its empty food bowl and the cupboard, when the door is opened (believes it will get food). [1; 2; 3b; 4e; 5c; 6b; 7a] 5. I look in the mirror, and then I take cold medicine (believe that I will get sick). [1; 2; 3a; 4d; 5a; 6b; 7a]
6. She prepares the grill for the steaks he will bring home (believes that he went to the store However, based upon an attribute type error pattern analysis the precise examples or non-examples required to achieve the terminal performance can be specified. An entirely different set of six examples and two non-examples would be required to test the concept, that is, the abstracttact/generic-extension relations.
